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NOTES
RESTITCHING THE AMERICAN MARITAL QUILT:
UNTANGLING MARRIAGE FROM THE NUCLEAR
FAMILY
Lisa Milot*
INTRODUCTION
M ARRIAGE is a mess. Statutory marriage,' common-law mar-
riage,2 covenant marriage,3 same-sex civil union,4 and domestic
agreement'-each signals a different shade of relationship, with dis-
tinct methods of entry and exit, and with disparate rights and
* J.D., University of Virginia, 2001. For their assistance on drafts of this Note, I
thank Julia Mahoney, John Terleph, and the staff of the Virginia Law Review. For
their more general academic assistance, I thank the Dodds Kovarik Foundation, Bill
and Carla Griffin, Karla Libby-Reidinger, Robert G. Milot, New College Foundation,
and N.Y.U. Anthropology Department.
'Statutory marriages are contracted under state statutes and generally involve
registration of the parties and some solemnization ceremony. This is the form that
commentators generally mean when referring to "traditional marriage."
2 A common-law marriage is created by consent of the parties and "does not depend
for its validity upon any religious or civil ceremony." John B. Crawley, Is the
Honeymoon Over for Common-Law Marriage: A Consideration of the Continued
Viability of the Common-Law Marriage Doctrine, 29 Cumb. L. Rev. 399, 401 (1998-
99). Under this doctrine, courts may recognize long-term relationships as valid
marriages. Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through Contract: Common Law
Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 Yale L.J. 1885,1886 (1998).
3 Like statutory marriage, covenant marriage is governed by state statutes and is
understood to be a lifelong commitment. Covenant marriages, however, require
counseling prior to both entry and exit and limits exit to instances of "complete and
total breach" by one spouse. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:272-274, 9:307, § 9:272(A)
(West 1999).
4 Vermont recently passed the first statute allowing same-sex couples to contract for
state-recognized status affording the rights and obligations of marriage. Vt. Governor
Signs Law Allowing Gay Civil Unions, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 2000, at A9 [hereinafter
Vermont Civil Unions]. Legislators have declined to label this relationship a
"marriage," though. See id. A number of states and communities allow same-sex
couples to register as domestic partners and receive some state and local marriage
benefits.
-Many states enforce both express and implied nonmarital domestic agreements
between cohabitants under traditional contract law. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, An
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obligations. The promulgation of the Defense of Marriage Acte
("DOMA") further confuses what it is to be married, as a marriage
established in one state does not need to be recognized by another
state or by the federal government. Inextricably linked with mar-
riage, although frequently held analytically separate, is divorce.
One of the two primary forms of exit from marriage today-the
other being death-divorce is similarly in disarray. Its frequency,
requisite bases, and moral status vary depending on the regime un-
der which one is living and to whom one is talking.
Part of the confusion results from marriage's dual conceptual
and legal roles as a contract between two parties and as a status re-
lating individuals and the state. Like many other statuses, individuals
contract into marriage and become bound to defined rights and ob-
ligations that adhere until the marriage is legally dissolved! Yet the
balance between contract and status is shifting. While family law
formerly governed marriages, marital responsibilities and property
divisions upon divorce can increasingly be fixed by antenuptial
contracts8 and settlement agreements Such contracting about mar-
riage and divorce is limited, though, by legal prohibitions on
couples redefining the content of the specific form of the marital
relationship, the terms of divorce, child custody arrangements, and
the division of parental responsibilities. Each of these is a limita-
tion on the ability of parties to define the family relationship for
themselves.
Marriage serves as a proxy for the nuclear family in contempo-
rary law as courts and legislatures make the economic elements of
a marriage available for negotiation, while leaving the disposition
of children and assignment of parental obligations nonnegotiable.
Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 291,304 (1987). As a
result, "[a] growing body of case law continues to define the rights of cohabitants in
their interactions with third parties, their employers, and the state." Id.
61 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999).
7 Other statuses into which individuals contract include landlord-tenant and employer-
employee.
8 Antenuptial, or prenuptial, contracts specify the rights of one spouse upon death
of the other spouse or upon divorce. Couples enter into these agreements in the
immediate anticipation of marriage, with an eye to the possibility of a future
dissolution.
9 Settlement agreements are contracts fixing property and support rights, reached in
anticipation of divorce. These are negotiated agreements reached in lieu of
impending judicial division of assets and responsibilities.
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As such, marriage is simultaneously overinclusive and underinclu-
sive since it encompasses married couples with no children and
omits from regulation families that exist outside of the current
framework of legal marriage. Marriage and family should be con-
ceptually and legally separated, with each governed by a distinct
regime rather than by a patchwork of contract and status laws that
conflates the two relationships. Given the current child-centered
focus of rationales for marital regulation, as expressed in both leg-
islative and academic writings, marriage-a long-term sexual,
social, and economic relationship between two adults-is properly
within the sphere of contract law, while regulation of families
might be an appropriate object of status designation with its con-
comitant rights and obligations.
Part I of this Note will trace the various threads of American
marriage law, particularly the perception that marriage is unravel-
ing today due to an unprecedented divorce crisis. Part II will
disentangle the conflicting patterns of contract law and status re-
gimes that variously govern marriage, focusing on the uneven
enforcement of antenuptial contracts and the implications of such.
Part III will argue that the true focus of regulation is the status of
the nuclear family, not of marriage per se. Finally, Part IV will
propose a bifurcation of the legal regimes governing marriage and
the family, recognizing the ability of individuals to order their pri-
vate lives without state involvement until third parties--children-
are involved. Laws designed to regulate, and arguably protect,
families need to be extended to include those families that are
formed outside legal marriages and limited to exclude married
couples without children.
I. A PATCHWORKED DocTRINE: THE MANY STRANDS OF
MARRIAGE LAW
Marriage law is currently a patchwork of overlapping doctrines
in which marriage itself has no single definition. The forms of mar-
riage range from public marriages implicating the state'0 to private,
10 Statutory marriages, covenant marriages, and some same-sex civil unions are
contracts between two individuals and a state.
2001] 703
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often informal, contractual relationships." Each doctrine consists
of a specific way of ordering the marital relationship with its own
mode of entry and exit and distinct attached rights, although the
trend is to treat marriage and the alternative forms of domestic ar-
rangements increasingly uniformly. Marriage is state-regulated:
Each state decides the requirements of a valid marriage contract,
those people who have contractual ability, the duties and obliga-
tions that adhere therein, and the grounds for dissolution. A
marriage contracted or a divorce obtained in one U.S. jurisdiction
has traditionally been valid in all the others. 4
Statutory marriage is the form most commonly associated with
the idea of marriage. State statutes govern it, and some form of
solemnization is generally required. Individuals contract into this
relationship, and the state confers legal status. 5 Very little is re-
quired to enter into a valid statutory marriage; general
qualifications usually involve age and degree of consanguinity, and
most states impose a three or five day waiting period.6 At no point
in American history have there been significant barriers to entry
into marriage. 7
Exit from statutory marriage has a more uneven past than entry
into it, and higher levels of regulation are associated with divorce.
Historically, ability to divorce was tightly restricted; when al-
l, Examples of these private contracts include domestic agreements, many same-sex
civil unions, and common-law marriages. Another regime regulating marriage is
religion; these regulations are, however, outside the scope of this discussion.
2 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va. L.
Rev. 1225,1333 (1998).
13 Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1933).
11 See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 356 (1948); Loughran, 292 U.S. at 223. Such
interstate recognition of marriages is a product of the federal system of government
and is one of the trade-offs necessary for its efficient functioning. The promulgation
of DOMA, however, may change interstate marriage recognition. See infra notes 55-
60 and accompanying text.
s Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) (citing Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp.
105, 107 (D. Nev. 1980) and O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565, 568-69 (E.D.N.Y.
1973)).
16 Ira Mark Ellman et al., Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems 56-57 (3d ed. 1998).
17See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and
Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev. 9,15 (1990) ("Even when marriage was presumed to be a life-
long commitment and divorce was rare, the law did little to promote thoughtfulness in
decisions to marry.").
"s Pennsylvania was the first state to enact a divorce statute when it did so in 1785;
Delaware was the last, waiting until 1897 to enact one. Until that time, a couple
[Vol. 87:701704
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lowed, it was limited to extreme circumstances as "[u]ntil the
1960's, most states allowed divorce only upon the proof by one
party that the other had committed a serious offense against the
marriage."'9 These barriers to exit, however, should not be con-
fused with stability in marriage since unhappy couples unable to
divorce in nineteenth-century America simply arranged their
households as they liked, regardless of the formal legal requisites?
Unhappy couples executed their own "divorces," informally "re-
married," or simply formed separate households. 1 Where divorce
was available, it required a showing of "fault," the exact meaning
of which varied by state, but generally involved some combination
of adultery, abandonment, and cruelty.' Yet the protection af-
forded marriage by this standard proved illusory: Legal scholars
have tracked the uncontested nature of most divorce proceedings
and have argued that this is indicative of complicity on the part of
needed to convince the state legislature to pass a bill that effected the individual
divorce. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, in Ellman et al.,
supra note 16, at 187, 188.
,9 Scott, supra note 17, at 15.
20 See generally Peter W. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex,
and the Law in the Nineteenth-Century South (1995) (analyzing the changes in
southern household dynamics through the Civil War period); Norma Basch, Relief in
the Premises: Divorce as a Woman's Remedy in New York and Indiana, 1815-1870, 8
Law & Hist. Rev. 1 (1990) (tracing the evolution of divorce law and its effect on
women's autonomy); Timothy J. Gilfoyle, The Hearts of Nineteenth-Century Men:
Bigamy and Working-Class Marriage in New York City, 1800-1890, 19 Prospects 135,
137 (1994) ("As 19th-Century Americans became increasingly mobile and urban,
bigamy appears to have been a more viable solution to marital unhappiness.");
Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and Marital Expectations in Nineteenth Century
America, 80 Geo. L.J. 95 (1991) (exploring judicial treatment of marital exit by
contractual agreement and by judicial divorce). Moreover, most nineteenth-century
marriages ended after about twenty years due to the death of one of the spouses.
Kaylah Campos Zelig, Putting Responsibility Back into Marriage: Making a Case for
Mandatory Prenuptials, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1223, 1224 (1993). Thus, modem divorce
"may merely be a functional substitute for death, made necessary by increasing
longevity." Ellman et al., supra note 16, at 219 (citing Lawrence Stone, The Family,
Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800, at 56).
21 Dubler, supra note 2, at 1896-97.
22 For example, California's fault grounds were "adultery, extreme cruelty, wilful
desertion, wilful neglect, habitual intemperance, conviction of a felony, or incurable
insanity." Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991
BYU L. Rev. 79,83 n.10 (1991).
2001] 705
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unhappy couples manufacturing adequate fault where none ex-
isted.'
While the move to no-fault divorce statutes in the 1970s and
1980s?4 is often blamed for a perceived rise in divorce rates,' some
scholars have argued that cause and effect are confused and that
no-fault divorce statutes simply brought the law into conformity
with the actual practice of divorce that had previously occurred de-
spite legal constraints.2 One text reports succinctly that divorce
rates "dramatically accelerated upward" in the 1960s and 1970s
while most of the shift to no-fault divorce laws occurred in the
early 1970s and 1980s, "after the largest increases in divorce rates
had already occurred."' Regardless of cause and effect, every state
currently has no-fault divorce statutes, although many maintain the
option of fault divorce. No-fault is increasingly criticized, however,
and at least eight states have recently considered bills requiring
2 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice
Before No-Fault, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1497, 1506-07 (2000) (surveying the practices of
manufacturing proof of fault and conscious perjuring by witnesses in divorce
proceedings throughout the United States in the mid-twentieth century); Gary H.
Nichols, Note, Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?,
29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 397, 425 (1999) (concluding that much fault litigation is no more
acrimonious than no-fault divorce proceedings).
24California passed the first such statute in 1970. Nichols, supra note 23, at 411-12,
418 n.118. South Dakota became the last state to move to no-fault when it enacted its
statute in 1985. Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual
Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 879, 880 n.9 (1988). Only four states-
Mississippi, New York, Ohio, and Tennessee-currently require mutual consent for
no-fault divorce while all other states allow a spouse to bring an action unilaterally.
Robert M. Gordon, Note, The Limits of Limits on Divorce, 107 Yale L.J. 1435, 1438
& n.22 (1998).
2 See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 Vand. L. Rev.
397, 398 n.4, 402 (1992) (noting that "[n]ot surprisingly, lowering the price of divorce
has increased its frequency" and reporting that the divorce rate in 1988 was about
48%); see also Michelle Dorsey Deis, Case Comment, Gross v. Gross: Ohio's First
Step Toward Allowing Private Ordering of the Marital Relationship, 47 Ohio St. L.J.
235,235 n.1 (1986) (highlighting increases in divorce rates from 1965 to 1979). But see
Robert S. Lynd & Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown: A Study in Contemporary
American Culture 121 & n.18 (1929) (reporting that divorce rates in one midwestern
American city with ordinary divorce laws and attitudes, ranged between 37% and
55% of the marriages contracted between 1918 and 1924).
2 See Friedman, supra note 23, at 1506-07; Nichols, supra note 23, at 416.
2 Ellman et al., supra note 16, at 221.
706
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proof of fault in all contested divorces.' Some commentators have
also called for increased mandatory waiting periods for divorce.29
Formal requirements for exit from statutory marriage have
shifted in recent decades and continue to shift today. These ad-
justments arguably mirror changes in popular attitudes from that
of marriage as a lifelong commitment to that of marriage as an on-
going agreement open to definition by the individuals involved.
In contrast to the legislative tangle around statutory marriage,
state approaches to common-law marriage prove more stable but
less widespread.' Such marriages are neither solemnized nor avail-
able in every state. Entry is by private agreement,3 requiring only
the couple's cohabitation and presentation of themselves as mar-
ried.2 The usual context for proving the existence of a common-
law marriage is upon dissolution of the relationship or death, al-
though it may also be proven in an independent action for
declaratory relief.33 Currently eleven states and the District of Co-
lumbia recognize this form of marriage; because of the full faith
28 Nichols, supra note 23, at 441 (citing proposals in Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Maryland, Michigan, Virginia, and Washington).
29See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale
L.J. 763, 795-96 (1983) (describing these waiting periods as ensuring more reasoned
actions in exiting marriage and arguing that speed is seldom essential in marital
decisions). A number of commentators have agreed that such periods should be
extended. See Gary S. Becker, Finding Fault with No-Fault Divorce, Bus. Wk., Dec.
7, 1992, at 22 (proposing limiting unilateral divorce to instances where a several-year
waiting period has occurred); Maggie Gallagher, Why Make Divorce Easy?, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 20, 1996, at A19 (proposing a five- to seven-year waiting period); William
A. Galston, Divorce American Style, 124 Pub. Interest 12, 22 (1996) (proposing a
five-year waiting period).
30 See Annotation, Validity of Common-Law Marriage in American Jurisdictions, 39
A.L.R. 538 (1925), supplemented by 60 A.L.R. 541 (1929), 94 A.L.R. 1000 (1935), 133
A.L.R. 758 (1941).31Ellman et al., supra note 16, at 64.
3 See Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52, 54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (per curiam); Crawley,
supra note 2, at 405; Dubler, supra note 2, at 1885-86; Annotation, Common-Law
Marriage Between Parties Previously Divorced, 82 A.L.R.2d 689 (1962); Annotation,
supra note 30, at 538.
33Annotation, Judicial Declaration of Validity or Existence of Common-Law
Marriage, 92 A.L.R.2d 1102 (1963).
The jurisdictions allowing common-law marriage are Alabama, Colorado, Iowa,
Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, and the District of Columbia. Crawley, supra note 2, at 400 n.4; see also
Annotation, supra note 30 (listing states recognizing common-law marriages in the
first half of the twentieth century). Three states-Georgia, Idaho and Ohio-that
20011 707
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and credit afforded a valid marriage in one state by other states,
though, all states recognize the legal legitimacy of a common-law
marriage contracted in another jurisdiction. 5 Once a common-law
marriage has been contracted and proven, it is part of the same le-
gal regime as statutory marriage. Thus, there is no analogous
common-law divorce by mutual agreement: 6 The confusion around
the terms of exit from statutory marriage applies to common-law
marriages as well.
A third, and arguably novel, form of marriage today is covenant
marriage. Covenant marriages are based on a view of marriage as a
lifelong commitment; as such, statutes instituting it heighten entry
requirements and reinstitute fault divorce as the sole voluntary
means of exit. Under the existent statutes, couples may choose a
covenant marriage at the time of applying for a marriage license
Louisiana and Arizona have passed such statutes,' and Tennessee
considered a similar proposal,39 all in an attempt to combat the per-
ceived high divorce rates.4' In Louisiana, a couple so electing is
required, prior to marriage, to undergo counseling from either a re-
ligious or professional marriage counselor concerning the "nature
and purposes of marriage and the responsibilities thereto."'" Only
upon "complete and total breach" by one spouse may the other
seek divorce. The future spouses commit to "take all reasonable
efforts to preserve [their] marriage, including marital counseling"
until recently allowed common-law marriages retreated from that stance in the 1990s,
while Utah revived it. Crawley, supra note 2, at 400 n.4. In general, though, common-
law marriage has fallen out of social and legal favor. See Ellman et al., supra note 16,
at 65 (remarking on the "general hostility to common-law marriage" in the United
States today).
35 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
m See Crawley, supra note 2, at 405, 410 (describing Alabama specifically); Haas,
supra note 24, at 881 n.13 (comparing this lack of common-law divorce in the United
States to such regimes in other societies).
See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:272(B) (West 1999); see also Melissa Lawton,
Note, The Constitutionality of Covenant Marriage Laws, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2471,
2472 (1998) (explaining this process); Nichols, supra note 23, at 398 (same).
33 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (2000); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:272-274,
9:307 (West 1999).
39 See Nichols, supra note 23, at 399 n.2.
See Margaret F. Brinig, Contracting around No-Fault Divorce, in The Fall and
Rise of Freedom of Contract 275, 275 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Nichols, supra note
23, at 399.
41 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:272(A), § 9:273(A)(2)(a) (1999).
42 Id. § 9:272(A).
708 [Vol. 87:701
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and aver that they have disclosed all potentially adverse informa-
tion to the other. 3 This option is actually anomalous more in the
ability to contract around the no-fault divorce regime than in the
ability to contract about the terms of marriage, since it is this for-
mer category that is most strictly constrained in ordinary marriage
jurisprudence."
In addition to these formal marriages, contractual cohabitation
is increasingly recognized legally in the form of domestic agree-
ments and, most recently, same-sex civil unions. While not labeled
"marriage," each of these arrangements exists on the border be-
tween marriage and purely contractual relations.
Domestic agreements are explicit or implicit contracts concern-
ing nonmarital cohabitation, fixing the property and financial
rights of the two parties. Many states allow such agreements as a
legally sanctioned alternative to marriage," and they are usually
enforced as written, as long as they are not based on sexual ser-
vices. 6 Such agreements do not afford the parties the status rights
of marriage.47 Exit is also less complex than from the above forms
of marriage: These agreements may be terminated as any other
contract and are also generally invalidated upon the marriage of
the parties to each other.'
Unlike domestic agreements, which are widely recognized but
generally exist in the purely contractual realm, same-sex civil un-
- Id. § 9:273(A)(1).
"See infra Section II.A.45See, e.g., Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998) (holding, in an often
followed opinion, that "relationship contracts" between unmarried couples are legally
enforceable so long as they do not violate public policy); see also Kay, supra note 5, at
304-09 (discussing judicial recognition of the validity of these agreements in
California).
46 Some states require an express contract, others a writing of some sort, while
others are willing to find and enforce even implied contracts. See Crawley, supra note
2, at 412-13 & nn.76 & 79 (outlining these approaches); Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation,
Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 Geo. L.J.
1829,1830-31 (1987) (same).
47For example, the Wilcox court held that parties to a domestic agreement do not
receive governmental marriage benefits. Wilcox, 693 N.E.2d at 146.
4s Andrea D. Heinbach & Pierce J. Reed, Wilcox v. Trautz: The Recognition of
Relationship Contracts in Massachusetts, 43 Boston B.J. 6, 19 (1999). Interestingly,
the recognition of marriage-like rights in such non-marital relationships is
inconsistent with the more general move away from the permissibility of common-law
marriages in the United States. Ellman et al., supra note 16, at 65.
2001] 709
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ions are not yet recognized in most jurisdictions. Where they are
recognized, however, these unions bring with them the status rights
of marriage. The first step in this direction was taken by the Hawaii
Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin. 9 The Baehr court held that
while there is no fundamental right for same-sex couples to
marry,O the state statute restricting marriage to opposite-sex cou-
ples established a sex-based classification subject to strict scrutiny
for the purposes of an equal protection challenge. 1 The court held
that the statute amounted to sex discrimination when analyzed un-
der this standard. 2 Following this decision, the Hawaii state
legislature amended the state constitution in 1998 to bar recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages, 3 and the state supreme court found
that "[t]he marriage amendment validated" the statute in question
in Baehr.'
In the wake of the Baehr decision, the U.S. Congress passed the
controversial Defense of Marriage Act5 5 which limits federal rec-
ognition of marriage, with its concomitant rights and responsibilities,
to opposite-sex couples.56 DOMA explicitly permits states to refuse
to "give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other State... respecting a relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State ... or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
5 7
This is in direct contradiction to Loughran v. Loughran," in which
the Supreme Court held that marriages validly contracted in one
state are constitutionally required to be given full faith and credit
49 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
5 Id. at 57.
51Id. at67.
5 Id.
0 Haw. Const. art. I, § 23.
m Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). For an overview of these events, see
Christopher Graff, Vermont Supreme Court Calls Rights for Gay Couples
'Constitutionally Required,' 221 The Legal Intelligencer 4 (Dec. 21, 1999).
I 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999).
'Id.
Id. § 1738C (Supp. V 1999).
292 U.S. 216 (1933).
[Vol. 87:701710
HeinOnline -- 87 Va. L. Rev. 710 2001
Restitching the American Marital Quilt
in all others." DOMA has yet to be challenged in federal court, al-
though some academics foresee successful future challenges."
More recently, same-sex civil unions have been legally recog-
nized as part of the marriage discussion for the first time in United
States history. In Baker v. Vermont,6 the Vermont Supreme Court
held that it was a violation of the state constitution62 to deny same-
sex couples the benefits and protections afforded opposite-sex
married couples. The plaintiffs in Baker were three same-sex cou-
ples who had been in committed relationships ranging from four to
twenty-five years; two of the couples had children they had raised
as a family.' The couples had applied for marriage licenses and
been rejected, and brought suit challenging the validity of the stat-
ute under which they were denied licenses. The trial court held in
favor of the defendants, finding that limiting marriage to opposite-
sex couples "rationally furthered the State's interest in promoting
'the link between procreation and child rearing.""'6 Recharacteriz-
ing the issue as one of equal treatment, the Vermont Supreme
Court held that same-sex couples must be afforded privileges and
responsibilities under state law equal to those enjoyed by opposite-
sex couples that are married.' The holding does not mandate that
same-sex couples be allowed to marry; instead, the Court left the
exact procedure for effecting the change to the legislature.67
The Vermont state senate passed the mandated bill in April
2000,' allowing same-sex couples to form civil unions. While not
511d. at 223.
10 See, e.g., Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the
Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1435, 1435 (1997)
(arguing that DOMA effectively "partially rescinds the Full Faith and Credit
Clause").
61744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
62The relevant provision of the Vermont Constitution is the Common Benefits
Clause, which provides, in pertinent part, "[t]hat government is, or ought to be,
instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or
community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person,
family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community." Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 7.
63Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
61 Id.
6Id. at 868.
66Id. at 867.
67Id.
61 After the Vermont House and Senate approved the bill, Governor Howard Dean
signed it into law on April 26,2000. See Vermont Civil Unions, supra note 4, at A9.
2001]
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labeled "marriages," these unions entitle the couples to all the
state benefits of marriage.69 The result is a confused doctrine in
which same-sex couples may contract into the marriage status, but
may not label it so. "Marriage" is reserved for and conflated with
the nuclear family ideal: two opposite-sex adults with their marital
children.
In sum, the variety of marriage and marriage-like arrangements
today fragment what is often thought to be a homogenous doc-
trine. As a result, marriage regulation is revealed as a patchwork of
disparate regimes that often prove contradictory. Moreover, the
perception that there is a divorce crisis, whether based in reality or
simply in popular myth, has led to calls for higher standards for di-
vorce and the development of even more marriage regimes.
Marriage remains on the seam of status and contract with elements
of its governance patterned on each, often with tangled results.
II. CHOOSING THE STITCH: CONTRACT OR STATUS AS THE RULING
MARRIAGE REGIME?
Professor Ellen Kandoian describes marriage as "conceptually
problematic" due to its nature as both public and private: It defines
both "the relationship between two people and.., their relation-
ship to the rest of society."'70 The result is a dual legal regime,
comprised of a combination of contract and status, and confusion
over who should ultimately order the marriage relationship. Under
this tangled system of regulation,7 contract rules govern entry into
marriage and, increasingly, the division of property upon exit,
while status rules govern the terms of exit and marriage's familial
components. In light of this duality, the question becomes how
marriage should be regulated.
Opponents of the law, however, made a number of gains in recent statewide elections.
See Ross Sneyd, Vermont's Divide: Voters Leave Issue of Gay Unions Unsettled,
The Record (Bergen County, N.J.), Nov. 9,2000, at A22.
"Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
10 Kandoian, supra note 46, at 1829 (footnote omitted).
71 See, e.g., id. at 1833 (describing a primary legal tension concerning marriage as
"the conflict between the status and the contract models of marriage"); Eric
Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the
Marriage Contract, 73 Ind. L.J. 453, 501 (1998) ("Marriage is still a matter of status,
and its failure to move to contract is causing much harm.") (footnote omitted);
Dubler, supra note 2, at 1907 (terming nineteenth-century marriage a "status
contract").
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A. Marriage as Contract
As a general trend marital regulation has evolved, albeit incom-
pletely, from status to contract.' Simultaneously, attitudes toward
and legal regimes regarding antenuptial agreements have changed.
While states have long allowed antenuptial agreements fixing the
distribution of assets upon the death of one spouse, it is only re-
cently that courts have enforced agreements activated upon
divorce or separation.' Previously, such agreements were usually
invalidated as against public policy because they were thought to
undermine marriage and promote divorce. 4
In the past decade, private ordering of property and financial ar-
rangements prior to marriage has become increasingly acceptable. 5
However, most couples do not draft antenuptial contracts. 6 Profes-
sors Eric Rasmusen and Jeffrey Stake identify the most common
reasons for not drafting such contracts as: the costs of legal draft-
ing; the failure of most couples to anticipate the possibility of
divorce at the time of marriage; a lack of awareness of the behavioral
incentives during marriage of the various possible terms; and a dis-
taste for signaling the possibility of failure to others, particularly
72 See Dubler, supra note 2, at 1885-90 (tracking the analysis of marriage as contract
in the nineteenth century). Professor Eric Posner suggests that instead of a status-
contract shift, there has been an "increasing exclusion of the crowd from participation
in the regulation of the family." Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in The
Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract, supra note 40, at 256, 273 (1999). The practical
difference between the two perspectives is unclear. In either model, aspects of
marriage that formerly were regulated by family law are increasingly negotiated as
contracts.
7 See, e.g., Deis, supra note 25, at 236. Of course, there is the ever-present caveat
that parties need to have full financial disclosure prior to entering into these contracts
and must not be subject to coercion. Id.; Robert Roy, Annotation, Modem Status of
Views as to Validity of Premarital Agreements Contemplating Divorce or Separation,
53 A.L.R.4th 22,28-29 (1987).
74See Ellman et al., supra note 16, at 799 ("The traditional premarital
agreement... applied only when the marriage ended by the death of a spouse
because premarital agreements 'contemplating' divorce were unenforceable in most
states."); Deis, supra note 25, at 236; Roy, supra note 73, at 28-29.
75 Haas, supra note 24, at 880 ("Private ordering of marital and postmarital
relationships generally has been accepted with respect to certain incidents of those
relationships--ownership of property and, to a lesser extent, support.") (footnote
omitted); Roy, supra note 73, at 29 (reporting that most courts now only invalidate
agreements that prove defective in execution or outcome).
7 6Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 71, at 454.
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one's soon-to-be spouse.' Despite increasing acceptance, antenup-
tial contracts are currently the exception, not the rule, particularly
since there is no guarantee that they will be judicially enforced. In
other words, the costs are high, but the benefits are uncertain.
Despite this uncertainty, antenuptial agreements concerning
property distribution upon divorce are increasingly upheld and, as
a result, more frequently entered into. In Buettner v. Buettner,' the
Nevada Supreme Court found that, contrary to previous assump-
tions about the effect of these provisions on marital stability, these
agreements may actually be conducive to marital harmony by clari-
fying the rights of each spouse." Thus the Buettner court held a
contested property settlement provision valid and enforceable.'
The current majority rule is to analyze property distribution provi-
sions in antenuptial agreements as ordinary contracts."1
Even where property settlements may be fixed ahead of time,
alimony, or financial support after the dissolution of the marriage,
is not always a permissible object of ex ante bargaining. In Favrot
v. Barnes, the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that premarital
understandings could not alter Louisiana's statutory marital obliga-
tions, specifically spousal support payments. The only aspect of the
"conjugal association" that the court found mutable was that relat-
ing to property.' The court held that alimony is a distinct
entitlement as a claim against a spouse, not against property, and
may only be limited by income, not by contractual arrangement.'
This approach, however, is increasingly becoming a minority one.
' Id. at 461. See also Stake, supra note 25, at 425-27 (discussing additional reasons
for the failure of many couples to draft antenuptial agreements, including social
customs or religious beliefs, personal superstition, and the assumption that their
relationships will endure).
78 505 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1973).79 Id. at 603.
81Id. at 605; see also Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 736 (Colo. 1982)
(upholding antenuptial agreement concerning property division).
"I See, e.g., Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 468 (Wyo. 1979) ("Antenuptial contracts
are governed by the same rules of construction as are applied to other contracts."
(citing In re Luedtke's Estate, 222 N.W.2d 643 (Wis. 2d 1974); In re Estate of
Johnson, 452 P.2d 286 (Kan. 1969))).
12332 So. 2d 873 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
13 Id. at 875.
4 Id.
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Other state alimony regulations have been determined to be de-
fault clauses around which parties may bargain under circumstances
courts consider to be fair.' In Simeone v. Simeone the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court located the traditional prejudice against
enforcement of these clauses in a paternalistic attitude that as-
sumed women were unable to understand the contracts they
signed. Rejecting this view, the Simeone court held that such con-
tracts could only be challenged if there was an incomplete or
otherwise unfair initial disclosure; absent such circumstances, ali-
mony clauses should be enforced as written. The only evidence of
reasonableness that was important, and in fact proved dispositive,
was the signing of the agreement by both parties. The court held
that once this step was taken, both spouses were entitled to rely on
their bargain. While this reliance argument is an extreme example
of the treatment of alimony arrangements, many other courts have
similarly upheld antenuptial contract provisions about support/° In
general today, antenuptial agreements about property distribution
and, to a lesser extent, alimony payments "will be enforced unless
there is a strong reason against enforcement .... [This approach] is
consistent with a presumption that freedom of contract should be
the baseline norm, deviation from which requires justification."91
This view of marriage as a contractual relationship, framed by
state-supplied default rules, exists in combination with a perceived
decline in the moral valence of marriage.' The relaxation or aboli-
tion of laws concerning fornication, cohabitation, adultery, and
15 Cf. Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage as Signal, in The Fall and Rise of Freedom of
Contract, supra note 40, at 245, 249 (arguing that a default alimony arrangement is
needed "to protect relationship-specific investments").
16581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
,a Id. at 166.
MId. at 166-67.
89 See id. at 166-67.
90 See, e.g., Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1980); Edwardson v. Edwardson,
798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990).
91 Katherine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 65,142 (1998).
92Of course, there are individuals and organizations who regard marriage as a
primarily religious or moral institution. The movement in the law, however, is away
from such an assessment, and it is this movement and its justifications that provide the
background for this Note. A normative assessment of the purposes of marriage is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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homosexuality in the past twenty-five years indicates a legal view,
at least, of sexual relationships as an inappropriate realm for state
regulation.' Moreover, scholars locate evidence of a declining
stigma attached to divorce with the rise of no-fault divorce,' term-
ing it a deliberate societal decision that the morality of individual
divorces proves too individual and too "complex for public, imper-
sonal, and adversarial discussion."'95 Instead, there has been a collective
decision that "life-long fidelity ought no longer be publicly enforced."'
Thus, it is no longer clear that an appropriate policy goal in regu-
lating marriage is simply ensuring more marriages or preventing
divorces. Instead, in devising regulations it might be more appro-
priate to uncover where this moral valuation is now focused and
devise an integrated legal regime that conforms to these social un-
derstandings.
B. Marriage as Status
Interspersed with the free contracting about marital property
and finances is a core of rights and responsibilities about which
contracting is not permitted. Here, marriage is a status, bringing
with it a set of rights and obligations that can be altered only by di-
vorce, not by mutual agreement.' The marital relationship is
therefore analogous to other relationships, such as landlord-tenant
and employer-employee, that, while entered into by private
agreement, also move the parties into distinct, nonnegotiable
statuses. This status model "views marriage as defining and
modifying, in an essential way, the identities of the marriage
partners .... The terms and conditions of marriage flow from the
9 See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American
Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1817-18 (1985); see also Heinbach & Reed, supra
note 48, at 18-19 (discussing the growing acceptability of many once-criticized living
arrangements).
14 See Scott & Scott, supra note 12, at 1240-41 ("Under the no-fault regime, the
notion of condemning a moral wrong is as out of place as it would be in a commercial
contract.").
95 Schneider, supra note 93, at 1809; see also Stake, supra note 25, at 401 ("'Married'
has now largely become a convenient condition, lasting only until either party
perceives a better alternative.").
9 Schneider, supra note 93, at 1809.
1 See Posner, supra note 72, at 270.
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status, not from private negotiation."' On the state level, common
examples of nonnegotiable marital rights and obligations include:
distinct income tax filing status; public assistance such as health
and welfare benefits; default rules concerning community property
distribution and control; dower, curtesy and inheritance rights;
child custody, child support payments, and enforceable spousal
support upon divorce; the right to enter into binding antenuptial
agreements; name change rights; spousal and marital communica-
tions privileges in legal proceedings; and the right to bring
wrongful death, and certain other, legal actions." On the federal
level, marriage results in: distinct housing entitlements; federal in-
come tax rates; Medicare, Medicaid, and veterans' benefits; and
immigration and citizenship rights."° A primary fighting point
when new types of legally-recognized relationships are proposed,
or when the already existent categories are expanded, is the extent
to which such changes will include these status rights and what
costs to society will result."'
Marriage is also treated as a status in laws concerning children,1"
parenting," and the terms of dissolution."0 Here, the law is immu-
IKandoian, supra note 46, at 1833.
99 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (listing the most important state
marital rights in Hawaii).
1w Heinbach & Reed, supra note 48, at 19.
10, Professors Elizabeth and Robert Scott point out that "[i]f the state extends
privileges and benefits to married couples that are not offered to individuals or
cohabiting couples, the value of marriage increases as compared to alternatives, and
getting and staying married becomes more attractive." Scott & Scott, supra note 12, at
1332. From this economic standpoint, then, to encourage marriage, the state should
restrict the categories to which marital benefits are available. This, however, is not the
current direction of marriage law.
1 See Haas, supra note 24, at 880 n.12 ("An agreement that adversely affects the
support rights of the parties' children will not control that matter."); Posner, supra
note 72, at 271 (citing abandonment and neglect of children as two primary
restrictions on premarital contractual freedom).
13 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362, 1371-72 (Wash. 1997)
(holding that the parenting plan provision of an antenuptial agreement may be
considered by a court as long as it was entered into "knowingly and voluntarily," but
that it is not binding on a court or the parties to it).
' See, e.g., Coggins v. Coggins, 601 So. 2d 109, 109-10 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992)
(holding that antenuptial agreements about the terms of divorce are against public
policy and thus invalid, despite the general enforceability of antenuptial provisions in
Alabama); see also Haas, supra note 24, at 880-81 ("[D]ivorce itself-the change of
marital status-has remained a matter of public rather than private ordering.").
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table-these are not default rules. This immutability is evidenced
by the repeated refusal of courts to uphold contractual terms re-
garding these issues, usually justified in terms of "the public
interest"-protecting children from the perceived psychological
and economic injury of divorce. 5 Regardless of whether such harm
actually results from divorce,C6 objections to divorce are usually
voiced in these terms. In fact, some states have dual legal regimes,
in which divorce is easily obtainable if there are no minor children,
but otherwise more rigorous standards must be met. For example,
many states have summary divorce procedures available for cou-
ples without children, through which divorce can be obtained
quickly by consent and a filed settlement agreement. The pres-
ence of minor children usually precludes a couple from seeking
these divorces."
Moreover, in Schibi v. Schibi, 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949), the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that an antenuptial agreement to annul a marriage six weeks after it was
contracted was unenforceable. Id. at 834. There were dual grounds for this refusal:
First, the court held that the terms of marital dissolution are set by the state and are
nonnegotiable. See id. at 833-34. Second, the court held that, as the purpose of the
marriage was the legitimizing of the couple's child and an annulment would invalidate
this act, enforcement of the agreement would undo what the act of marriage had
accomplished. Id. at 833. The court focused on the latter concern in its discussion of
the case, although its specific holding rested on the former ground. The effect of the
decision was to enforce the nuclear family arrangement, not the contractual bargain.
I' See, e.g., Scott, supra note 17, at 11 ("Of particular concern are the most
vulnerable casualties of the modem marriage, the minor children of divorce. Children
typically bear substantial psychological and economic costs for a decision in which
they have no role."); Stake, supra note 25, at 408 ("Children may bear a large
emotional burden [from divorce]. Though researchers have argued about it, there is
substantial evidence that marital breakup causes psychological injury to children.").
101 See Ellman et al., supra note 16, at 241 (citing studies comparing behavioral
problems of children pre- and post-divorce and concluding that "[iut is not as clear
that divorce is bad for children as one might think" and that "[o]ne can assume that
children suffer when a marriage breaks down but be less certain that they suffer from
divorce").
107 Id. at 205 (discussing summary divorce statutes).
I' Only Washington and Colorado allow these proceedings for couples with minor
children. Id. at 205-06. Moreover, some states have considered altering regular
divorce standards if there are minor children involved. For example, Tennessee
recently considered repealing part of its divorce statute to prevent divorcing parents
from stipulating to fault grounds or irreconcilable differences if children are involved,
because in many instances this would effectively result in a return to a no-fault
standard. See Nichols, supra note 23, at 441 n.270 (citing § 323, 100th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Tenn. 1997)).
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The perceived harm to children from divorce has led some legal
scholars to call for even stricter divorce standards for couples with
children."° Professor Elizabeth Scott argues that a broad-based
dual legal regime-one for couples with minor children and one
for couples without minor children-might be more appropriate
than the current no-fault regime.' In a more radical proposal, Pro-
fessor Mary Ann Glendon advocates that, in marriages that have
resulted in children, all property upon divorce should be consid-
ered "family property" and distributed to guarantee the financial
security of the children and their custodial parent upon divorce.1
The objective of these proposals is protecting minor children and
the traditional nuclear family; these scholars do not analyze mar-
riage itself as something that must be protected.
One clearly problematic aspect of marriage as status is that state
law governs marriage, so moving from one state to another
changes the terms of marriage and divorce."' This issue recently
arose in the context of same-sex civil unions and led to the promul-
gation of DOMA."' Within marriages not covered by DOMA,
Professors Rasmusen and Stake observe "it only takes one state al-
lowing contracts to put pressures on others. If one state passes the
law, and couples see the options as attractive, that state will be-
come a magnet for marriage ceremonies""' 4  and divorce
proceedings. Thus, outside DOMA's sphere, all it takes is one state
changing its approach to which terms are subject to private order-
ing to effect a national change. The result is a potential race to
divorce filing, where the first spouse to file gets to choose the re-
gime under which a contract is evaluated.
101 See Scott, supra note 17, at 91 (recommending that parents of minor children be
subject to a mandatory two-year separation period prior to divorce). Of course, other
scholars argue that divorce restrictions harm children by causing parents to engage in
more contentious conduct, causing additional psychological injury to the children. See
Gordon, supra note 24, at 1457. Moreover, fault divorces are more expensive to
litigate than no-fault ones, leading to additional economic injury to children from
divorce. See id. at 1461.
110 See Scott, supra note 17, at 91.
" Kay, supra note 5, at 317-18 (discussing Professor Glendon's proposal).
12 Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 71, at 500.
"1 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999); see supra text accompanying notes 55-57 for
DOMA's central provisions.
114 Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 71, at 500.
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In sum, while private ordering of marriage and its dissolution is
increasingly allowed with respect to property distribution and
spousal support, courts and legislatures have consistently resisted
negotiation concerning child support, parenting, and the terms of
divorce. The limitations on the ability of parties to contract are
frequently justified by reference to the needs of children and the
preservation of the family. Where children and the very existence
of the family are perceived to be unaffected or only tangentially af-
fected by antenuptial agreements, such agreements are usually
upheld.115 Where children or the existence of the familial relation-
ship are themselves the subjects of a contract, however, courts
consistently refuse to uphold any such agreement."6 In these in-
stances, courts focus on preservation of the nuclear family ideal as
long as possible by refusing to uphold contractual provisions dictat-
ing the terms of divorce itself and by establishing longer waiting
periods and higher levels of proof if a nuclear family is involved.
Thus regulation of marriage is revealed as a proxy for regulation of
the nuclear family ideal.
III. UNRAVELING THE DOcTRINE: MARRIAGE AS NUCLEAR
FAMILY PROXY
Viewed as a whole, laws regulating marriage and divorce are
confusing and contradictory. While much of marriage law is con-
tract law, with couples allowed to negotiate the economic terms of
their marriages, courts and legislatures consistently prevent cou-
ples from fixing the non-economic aspects of their marriages. Such
limitations on couples' contractual freedom are invariably linked to
state manipulation and preservation of the nuclear family."
Court decisions, proposed legislation, and academic scholarship
evidence that the true focus of marriage regulation is the creation
and perpetuation of the nuclear family. The Supreme Court, in
115 See supra notes 75, 81-84 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
17 As used in this Note, the term "nuclear family" refers to the family form, often
termed the "traditional family," (although there is no evidence that there is anything
traditional about it) of two opposite-sex parents with their marital offspring. This is
not an ideal family form in any objective sense, just the form that contemporary
legislation, jurisprudence, and academic literature seek to produce and maintain.
720 [Vol. 87:701
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Skinner v. Oklahoma,"' located the fundamental right to marry in
the right of procreation, not in marriage per se,"9 failing to recog-
nize that the two concepts are, at best, imperfectly overlapping.
Moreover, a strong point of contention in the drafting of Ver-
mont's same-sex civil union bill was a proposed amendment
declaring that one of the central purposes of marriage is procrea-
tion.2 In effect, arguments such as this sanction the production of
the nuclear family through the medium of marriage. While the
Vermont legislature did not ultimately adopt this amendment or
the perspective embodied in it, those opposed to allowing same-sex
couples to marry articulated their objections by focusing on the in-
ability of same-sex couples to procreate and to conform to the
nuclear family model.' Social and legal commentators, in analyz-
ing the state of the law and proposing changes, focus most strongly
on the effect of various regulations on the nuclear family, and it is
here that moral valence is most clearly associated with questions of
marriage and divorce. For example, Professor Carl Schneider ob-
serves that the belief that parents are obliged to support their
children through their minority is one of the few "moral" judg-
ments concerning marriage and divorce that is still judicially
enforced." This is a clear focus on the meaning of family, and the
responsibility of family members to one another, not on marriage
itself. Moreover, Professor Schneider and others have argued that
the "most stable, healthy, safe, and happy environments for adults
and children is the traditional nuclear family."'" In fashioning re-
strictions on the freedom to contract about the terms and outcome
I' 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
119 Id. See also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55-56 (Haw. 1993) (using the Skinner
Court's logic as the basis for holding that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex
couples does not violate substantive due process by divesting them of a fundamental
right to marry).
m See Vermont Senate OKs Measure on Gay Unions, The Desert News (Salt Lake
City, Utah), Apr. 19,2000, at A2.
121 See id.
'" Schneider, supra note 93, at 1812.
"'Nichols, supra note 23, at 433 & n.210 (citing Carl E. Schneider, The Law and the
Stability of Marriage: The Family as a Social Institution, in Promises to Keep 187, 188
(David Popenoe et al. eds., 1996)). See also Ronald L. Simons & Assocs.,
Understanding Differences Between Divorced and Intact Families 217 (1996)
(suggesting policies designed to encourage families to stay together as one approach
to promoting healthier children).
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of divorce, wherever the focus is on children and not on the rela-
tionship between the parties to the marriage, the real object of
regulation is the nuclear family.
As a proxy for the nuclear family, marriage is simultaneously
overinclusive and underinclusive. Couples without children are in-
cluded in the regime, while unmarried couples with children are
excluded. Both of these situations are problematic.
In its overinclusive aspect, regulating the family through regula-
tion of marriage subjects married couples without children to
unnecessary costs. Since the regulatory efforts are articulated in
terms of marriage, these couples are prevented from freely con-
tracting the terms of divorce. They remain in a status regime
despite the absence of the factor--children-that is the primary le-
gal rationale for their placement there. This results in inefficient
antenuptial contracts concerning divorce, or no such contracts at
all, even though it is at the outset of a marriage that parties can
most rationally and most collaboratively set out the terms they de-
sire in the event of dissolution. Moreover, couples are prevented
from signaling their intentions in the marriage. By refusing to up-
hold contractual provisions defining breaches and their consequences,
potential spouses are prevented from signaling their commitment
to and expectations from the relationship. 4 This greatly reduces a
couple's incentives to negotiate their own marital terms, because
there are no legally enforceable consequences for breach of their
commitments, nor any legal recourse if a partner should so
breach."
Recognition of the legal failure to allow couples to enter into
binding contracts concerning marriage has led some commentators
to argue that antenuptial agreements should be mandatory,"6 while
,24See Scott & Scott, supra note 12, at 1329-30.
17 Professors Margaret Brinig and Steven Crafton make an analogous argument
about the effect of no-fault divorce laws. They argue that the rise of the no-fault
regime has caused spouses to invest less in marriage and children than they otherwise
would have by making it clear that marital promises are legally unenforceable.
Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. Legal
Stud. 869,892-94 (1994).
126 See, e.g., Stake, supra note 25, at 429-30 (suggesting standardized form
antenuptial agreements and a legal regime requiring their completion prior to the
issuance of a marriage license); Zelig, supra note 20, at 1230-31 (arguing that couples
should be required to register a marriage contract with the state prior to a marriage
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others have devised complicated schemes for different divorce
standards depending on whether minor children are involved."l
This bifurcated divorce scheme, however, is only necessary when
marriage is overinclusively used as a proxy for the nuclear family.
In its underinclusive aspect, regulation of the family through
marriage reaches too few families. The U.S. Census Bureau re-
ported that in 1994 there were approximately 3,661,000 unmarried
couples cohabiting; of these, 1,270,000 had children under fifteen
years old." If legislators are concerned about protecting children
and better ensuring that they grow up in a two-parent household,
then regulations concerning the right of exit from a relationship
should properly include these 1,270,000 families, as well as those
who formally enter into marriage. Thus, analyzing marriage as an
underinclusive proxy for the family reveals that regulation of mar-
riage and regulation of family need to be separated to accomplish
the commonly articulated goal of reducing the externalities of the
breakdown of families on children and society.
Once it becomes clear that the goal of marriage and divorce laws
is to regulate the nuclear family, not marriage itself, much of the
current confusion in existing law can be eliminated. While scholars
have suggested that one set of rules is inappropriate to accomplish
this ideal,'29 their solution repeatedly has been to devise alternative
schemes for regulating marriage, rather than developing means for
disentangling the doctrinal threads of marriage and family.
IV. RESTITCHING THE QUILT: FORMULATING A COHERENT LEGAL
APPROACH TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
The arguments for limiting contractual freedom regarding the
terms of divorce and the disposition of children prove tenuous at
best if the protected status at the focus of such limitations is the
ceremony or, for common-law marriage, prior to presenting themselves to the
community as married).
' See Scott, supra note 17, at 90 ("[T]he legal rules will distinguish parents from
other divorcing spouses."); see also Nichols, supra note 23, at 419 ("When a family
has a minor child, the no-fault statute may work differently; for example, there may
be a longer waiting period before the couple can be divorced.").
I' Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P20-484, Marital
Status and Living Arrangements: March 1994.
129 See, e.g., Stake, supra note 25, at 414 ("[T]he proposed reforms suffer from the
prevailing presumption that we can structure one law to fit all marriages.").
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family, rather than marriage. Professor Anthony Kronman de-
scribes many limits on contractual freedom as either protection of
the interests of third parties or paternalism. He defines paternalism
as the imposition of legal rules "that prohibit[] an action [because]
it would be contrary to the actor's own welfare."" Through the
lens of the warranty of habitability in landlord-tenant law, Profes-
sor Kronman argues that paternalism is justified when there are a
sufficient number of fraudulent bargains that would otherwise be
judicially enforced.'31 Such situations exist where fraudulent bar-
gains would be enforced more often, and their fraudulence would
be less easily proven, than in bargaining situations in general.
Then, paternalism achieves an effective result and is socially desir-
able." Moreover, paternalism may be justified when used to
achieve distributive justice: to overcome the effects of clearly and
abnormally unequal bargaining power by shifting control from the
more powerful party to the less powerful and refusing to let the
parties bargain around this distribution." Many instances of pater-
nalism, however, cannot be justified on either efficiency or
redistributive grounds.TM
In the marital context, the distinction between contractual limits
to protect third parties and paternalistic limits that unjustifiably re-
strict freedom of choice differentiates the legal rules devised to
protect the nuclear family from those that limit the ability of the
parties to a marriage to negotiate their own contract. Rules de-
signed to protect the nuclear family focus on protecting children-
third parties to any contract negotiated between the parents. The
presence of children may create circumstances warranting govern-
mental interference in a right to contract. Such interference in the
absence of children, however, is paternalism-an effort to define
for the contracting parties what their best interests are. Without
sufficient rationale, such paternalistic intervention is simply unwar-
ranted.
Removing concerns about possible harm to children resulting
from divorce and recognizing that the focus of legislation is the
DO Kronman, supra note 29, at 763.
3 Id. at 768.
m Id.
133 Id. at 770-72.
'3 Id. at 774-75.
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family relationship itself, the argument for limiting contractual
freedom in marriage is premised on the assumption that women
and men have unequal bargaining power.35 Under this view, free-
dom to bargain about the terms of the marriage and its dissolution
tends to disfavor women and is likely to produce inequitable bar-
gains. Therefore, it is better to deem these contracts void ex ante
rather than create a bad result ex post. This perspective bears a
striking similarity to the historical justification for the limitations
placed on women's abilities to contract: Women are less powerful
than men and need societal protection in the form of voiding the
bargains they strike.'36
This perspective ignores both economic and social realities. Con-
trary to this pessimistic view, ex ante bargaining might actually
produce better outcomes for women than ex post negotiations.
First, parties bargaining ex ante are more likely to devise terms
that deal with role specialization and asymmetric investment in a
mutually beneficial way." An unhappy potential spouse always has
the powerful bargaining position of the freedom to walk away prior
to any social or economic investment in the marriage. Second, even
if a woman's bargaining power is less than that of her potential
husband, the disparity is generally smaller going into the marriage
than it is coming out of it, after she may have spent the duration of
the marriage removed from the workforce." Third, judicial bar-
See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 12, at 1243 ("Feminists... argu[e] that women
are socially and psychologically disabled in negotiating the marriage contract in ways
that will systematically result in their getting a smaller share of the benefits of
marriage.").
136 See Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (criticizing this approach).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that such assumptions are inappropriate and
deleterious today. Id.
Scott & Scott, supra note 12, at 1247 (employing a hypothetical bargaining
heuristic to predict the outcome of antenuptial negotiations in the shadow of default,
rather than mandatory, divorce laws).
In See generally Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected
Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America 184-214
(1985) (describing older homemakers in marriages of long duration as one group
explicitly exempted from self-sufficiency standards under California alimony law); Ira
Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 43-44 (1989) ("The
traditional wife... makes substantial investments early in expectation of a deferred
return [and] ... depletes her capital assets while making those investments."); Zelig,
supra note 20, at 1237 & n.68 ("[T]he woman's position is better at [a marriage's]
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gains struck after the demise of the marriage have generally proven
inadequate to maintain either the pre-divorce financial condition
of women or their financial position relative to their ex-husbands.'39
In fact, Professor Thomas Oldham argues "a major cause of the
current financial problems of divorced women is that they made
major life decisions in prior decades without considering the possi-
bility of divorce."'" Finally, the social consequences of disallowing
ex ante negotiating can be high, because such a rule perpetuates a
view of women as incompetent to enter into contracts on their own
behalf.
Instead of limiting contractual freedom in marriage, the more
appropriate solution might be a purely contractual regime. If the
status aspects of marriage law are removed upon recognition of
their actual role as proxy for nuclear family law, what remains is
two adults voluntarily structuring the terms of their relationship.
The social functions of marriage can still be adequately performed
through non-legal religious ceremonies and recognition that mari-
tal contracts are the legal framework of any marriage. Entry into
marriage would thus have higher ex ante negotiation costs than
currently, but this in itself is not necessarily undesirable. Instead, it
places marital negotiation costs where they more appropriately be-
long, on the couples entering into a relationship, rather than on
society in the form of court costs.
In this understanding, the appropriate moment for state inter-
vention becomes the birth or adoption of a child within a
relationship that approximates a nuclear family. The focus of any
regulation predicated on concern for children and the formation
and maintenance of a nuclear family should be this family form it-
self, not marriage as its proxy. The traditional status-based
limitations on marriage and divorce should shift, instead, to be-
come limitations on the dissolution of nuclear family relationships,
regardless of the marital status of the parents.
The problem with such a scheme is defining the appropriate unit
of regulation. "Family" is a slippery term, and marriage has un-
inception than at dissolution, when her career sacrifices and child rearing have
typically left her in an economically dependent state.").
'3 See Zelig, supra note 20, at 1237 & n.69.
4 J. Thomas Oldham, Premarital Contracts Are Now Enforceable, Unless .... , 21
Hous. L. Rev. 757,785 (1984).
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doubtedly served as its proxy because there is a clear legal moment
at which the state may intervene-the moment of marriage-and
there are clearly identifiable individuals covered by the law-the
couple. Yet clarity alone does not make one law better than other
alternatives, and the clarity chosen thus far leaves millions of chil-
dren outside the protection of the law and unnecessarily includes
too many childless couples within its constraints. Moreover, the
current legal regime has worn thin and has only poorly and incom-
pletely been patched with the recent laws that stretch to define
marriage, resulting in a confused and uncertain approach toward
divorce.
Disentangling these legal regimes produces higher marriage en-
try costs, but lower and clearer exit costs. This financial restructuring
might encourage fewer marriages and, absent children, more di-
vorces. Exiting from a family, however, would have clear and high
costs. As marriage and divorce are themselves often perceived as
morally neutral,' this outcome could actually be desirable: Cou-
ples would have the incentive to enter carefully into marriage, have
the ability to leave with known consequences, and be better able to
assess the decision to have children with full awareness of the eco-
nomic and lifestyle consequences of that decision.
CONCLUSION
Modern marriage law is unnecessarily complicated. Its forms
and contours are rearranged regularly as legislatures and courts try
to make sense of the overlapping and thinly-worn doctrines regu-
lating state-recognized relationships. Through an analysis of the
dual regimes of contract and status approaches to marriage, it be-
comes apparent that the forms and existence of families are the
true objects of regulation. Marriage is used as a convenient proxy
for families, but such use is inappropriate due to its overinclusive-
ness, ineffective due to its underinclusiveness, and unnecessarily
confusing due to its inexact fit. Moreover, after recognizing that it
is the composition and protection of families-in particular, nu-
clear families-that is the true focus of marriage regulation, many
restrictions on contractual freedom in marriage are revealed as pa-
141 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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ternalistic. Since such restrictions are neither efficient nor redis-
tributive, they should be lifted. The appropriate focus of contractual
restrictions and object of the attachment of status rules proves to
be the family: Any restrictions need to be tailored to this subject,
rather than clumsily operating through the patchworked proxy of
marriage.
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